Thanks to history, the party and PLA have a unique relationship - but which is the boss
Chow Chungyan and Minnie Chan 27 September 2009
Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, Mao Zedong once famously said. Sixty years after the founding of the People’s Republic, many of Mao’s other teachings have been forgotten and forsaken - but not this one. Every top communist leader since Mao has known what supreme power rests upon.
To this day, the People’s Republic has no official national army. The 2.3-million-strong People’s Liberation Army is the largest armed force in the world, but its ultimate loyalty is to the Communist Party alone.
According to the constitution of the People’s Republic, the PLA is “under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. The party guarantees its control over the military through a complex but thorough system of commissars and political departments at every level of the armed forces. Ultimately, the PLA take orders from the Central Military Commission (CMC), not from the Ministry of National Defence - which falls under the civilian government.
Theoretically, there are two CMCs - the party CMC and the state CMC. The creation of a state CMC in 1982 was seen as a move to answer criticism and give the PLA a shade of national colour.
The commander-in-chief of the state CMC is the president of the Republic. In practice though, the state CMC is identical to the party CMC in membership, rendering the claim that the PLA is also a national armed force purely academic.
Over the past two decades, China has pushed vigorously to turn the PLA into a modern fighting force. Its military doctrines were drastically revised to keep them abreast with the latest developments. Its hardware was upgraded and expanded and its soldiers received better training and command. But the core value of the PLA as a safeguard of the Communist Party’s political monopoly remains unchanged.
Ted Galen Carpenter, vice-president for defence and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, says the Communist Party leaders fully understand that the PLA is probably the only institution capable of ending the party’s political domination.
“They are determined to maintain tight controls so that such a possibility does not arise,” Carpenter said.
The importance of the military in politics can be seen by the role the PLA has played in the transfer of power. In the past 60 years, the military has twice intervened to decide who should be China’s next supreme leader.
The first time happened in October 1976, when Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng teamed up with marshal Ye Jianying to bring down the Gang of Four - headed by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing . Everyone knew Ye, not Hua, was behind the coup. Hua was soon brushed aside and Deng Xiaoping - a close ally of Ye and a respected military leader himself - took over.
The second time was more tragic. Driven by anger and disappointment at widespread corruption, hundreds of thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest in 1989. The party was divided over how to best handle the situation, with general secretary Zhao Ziyang calling for dialogue with students while Premier Li Peng demanded a forceful crackdown. Eight powerful party elders, headed by Deng, backed Li and imposed martial law in Beijing. The army was called in to enforce the order but many civilian protesters tried to block its advance. After weeks of stalemate, the PLA soldiers opened fire on the crowds and forced their way to Tiananmen Square.
The brutal crackdown on June 4, 1989, shocked the world and resulted in a major leadership reshuffle. Zhao, nominally the head of the party, had failed to secure the one key position that really mattered - the chairmanship of the CMC - a position Deng refused to give up.
Zhao and his associates were purged from the party and Deng chose Jiang Zemin from Shanghai to lead the party. The 1989 crackdown was the last time the military directly intervened in politics, but it left one thing clear to everyone: the PLA is the ultimate arbiter in China’s politics.
Absolute control of the military by the party is the norm in communist countries. But in China’s case, the links between the two are particularly strong and inseparable.
Established by a group of former Kuomintang soldiers in an armed uprising in 1927, the Red Army was the core of the whole Chinese communist movement and very often its only reason for survival. The success or failure of the Red Army on the battlefield largely decided the fate of the party. Unsurprisingly, almost all important party leaders, including Mao, Deng and Zhou Enlai, had important positions in the Red Army and took direct charge of large military campaigns.
The character-defining experience for the Red Army - later renamed the People’s Liberation Army - was its military struggle with the Kuomintang forces in the brutal civil war between 1945 and 1949. The military victory was the sole reason for the founding of the People’s Republic.
In contrast, the Red Army of the Soviet Union never had such political impact.
“[The October Revolution in 1917] was the work of an uprising by sailors, workers and Cheka [the forerunner of the KGB],” said Andrei Chang, chief editor of the Canadian-based Kanwa Defence Review. “The Red Army was founded by Leon Trotsky in 1918 - months after the Revolution.”
The defining moment for the Soviet Red Army was the so-called “Great Patriotic War” against Nazi Germany during the second world war. To rally as much support as possible, Joseph Stalin and the party repeatedly stressed it was a patriotic war - a struggle of Russian and other Soviet peoples against the racist German invaders, not a war rooted in ideological differences.
Chang said these differences meant that the PLA’s direct involvement in China’s politics was much more pronounced.
“Because it played a key role in the founding of the People’s Republic, the PLA could direct the party’s policies under some special circumstances,” he said.
Despite all the changes in the past six decades, ties between the party and the PLA remained strong. From time to time, some voices have been heard questioning the identity of the PLA. But they are instantly suppressed by the party-controlled media organs, which regularly churn out articles stressing the importance of the party’s absolute control of the military.
In a way, both sides have benefited from this alliance. “The PLA’s modernisation over the past two decades or so has rendered it a more capable, powerful and useful institution for the party,” Carpenter said. “That development also creates important incentives for the party to placate the PLA through generous budgets and a willingness to accord military leaders a meaningful voice in policy decisions. Nevertheless, the party, not the military, remains the senior partner in that relationship.”
Other military experts say it is this close relationship that will stop the PLA becoming a truly modern military force. “As long as the PLA still puts safeguarding the party’s political monopoly as its top priority, it will never have true transparency or legitimacy,” said Andrew Yang Nien-dzu, of the Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.
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China’s political force
Thanks to history, the party and PLA have a unique relationship - but which is the boss
Chow Chungyan and Minnie Chan
27 September 2009
Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, Mao Zedong once famously said. Sixty years after the founding of the People’s Republic, many of Mao’s other teachings have been forgotten and forsaken - but not this one. Every top communist leader since Mao has known what supreme power rests upon.
To this day, the People’s Republic has no official national army. The 2.3-million-strong People’s Liberation Army is the largest armed force in the world, but its ultimate loyalty is to the Communist Party alone.
According to the constitution of the People’s Republic, the PLA is “under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”. The party guarantees its control over the military through a complex but thorough system of commissars and political departments at every level of the armed forces. Ultimately, the PLA take orders from the Central Military Commission (CMC), not from the Ministry of National Defence - which falls under the civilian government.
Theoretically, there are two CMCs - the party CMC and the state CMC. The creation of a state CMC in 1982 was seen as a move to answer criticism and give the PLA a shade of national colour.
The commander-in-chief of the state CMC is the president of the Republic. In practice though, the state CMC is identical to the party CMC in membership, rendering the claim that the PLA is also a national armed force purely academic.
Over the past two decades, China has pushed vigorously to turn the PLA into a modern fighting force. Its military doctrines were drastically revised to keep them abreast with the latest developments. Its hardware was upgraded and expanded and its soldiers received better training and command. But the core value of the PLA as a safeguard of the Communist Party’s political monopoly remains unchanged.
Ted Galen Carpenter, vice-president for defence and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, says the Communist Party leaders fully understand that the PLA is probably the only institution capable of ending the party’s political domination.
“They are determined to maintain tight controls so that such a possibility does not arise,” Carpenter said.
The importance of the military in politics can be seen by the role the PLA has played in the transfer of power. In the past 60 years, the military has twice intervened to decide who should be China’s next supreme leader.
The first time happened in October 1976, when Mao’s heir Hua Guofeng teamed up with marshal Ye Jianying to bring down the Gang of Four - headed by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing . Everyone knew Ye, not Hua, was behind the coup. Hua was soon brushed aside and Deng Xiaoping - a close ally of Ye and a respected military leader himself - took over.
The second time was more tragic. Driven by anger and disappointment at widespread corruption, hundreds of thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square to protest in 1989. The party was divided over how to best handle the situation, with general secretary Zhao Ziyang calling for dialogue with students while Premier Li Peng demanded a forceful crackdown. Eight powerful party elders, headed by Deng, backed Li and imposed martial law in Beijing. The army was called in to enforce the order but many civilian protesters tried to block its advance. After weeks of stalemate, the PLA soldiers opened fire on the crowds and forced their way to Tiananmen Square.
The brutal crackdown on June 4, 1989, shocked the world and resulted in a major leadership reshuffle. Zhao, nominally the head of the party, had failed to secure the one key position that really mattered - the chairmanship of the CMC - a position Deng refused to give up.
Zhao and his associates were purged from the party and Deng chose Jiang Zemin from Shanghai to lead the party. The 1989 crackdown was the last time the military directly intervened in politics, but it left one thing clear to everyone: the PLA is the ultimate arbiter in China’s politics.
Absolute control of the military by the party is the norm in communist countries. But in China’s case, the links between the two are particularly strong and inseparable.
Established by a group of former Kuomintang soldiers in an armed uprising in 1927, the Red Army was the core of the whole Chinese communist movement and very often its only reason for survival. The success or failure of the Red Army on the battlefield largely decided the fate of the party. Unsurprisingly, almost all important party leaders, including Mao, Deng and Zhou Enlai, had important positions in the Red Army and took direct charge of large military campaigns.
The character-defining experience for the Red Army - later renamed the People’s Liberation Army - was its military struggle with the Kuomintang forces in the brutal civil war between 1945 and 1949. The military victory was the sole reason for the founding of the People’s Republic.
In contrast, the Red Army of the Soviet Union never had such political impact.
“[The October Revolution in 1917] was the work of an uprising by sailors, workers and Cheka [the forerunner of the KGB],” said Andrei Chang, chief editor of the Canadian-based Kanwa Defence Review. “The Red Army was founded by Leon Trotsky in 1918 - months after the Revolution.”
The defining moment for the Soviet Red Army was the so-called “Great Patriotic War” against Nazi Germany during the second world war. To rally as much support as possible, Joseph Stalin and the party repeatedly stressed it was a patriotic war - a struggle of Russian and other Soviet peoples against the racist German invaders, not a war rooted in ideological differences.
Chang said these differences meant that the PLA’s direct involvement in China’s politics was much more pronounced.
“Because it played a key role in the founding of the People’s Republic, the PLA could direct the party’s policies under some special circumstances,” he said.
Despite all the changes in the past six decades, ties between the party and the PLA remained strong. From time to time, some voices have been heard questioning the identity of the PLA. But they are instantly suppressed by the party-controlled media organs, which regularly churn out articles stressing the importance of the party’s absolute control of the military.
In a way, both sides have benefited from this alliance. “The PLA’s modernisation over the past two decades or so has rendered it a more capable, powerful and useful institution for the party,” Carpenter said. “That development also creates important incentives for the party to placate the PLA through generous budgets and a willingness to accord military leaders a meaningful voice in policy decisions. Nevertheless, the party, not the military, remains the senior partner in that relationship.”
Other military experts say it is this close relationship that will stop the PLA becoming a truly modern military force. “As long as the PLA still puts safeguarding the party’s political monopoly as its top priority, it will never have true transparency or legitimacy,” said Andrew Yang Nien-dzu, of the Chinese Council for Advanced Policy Studies in Taipei.
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