CCP must find way to transfer power in a stable manner
By Ching Cheong 12 April 2012
The Bo Xilai saga has taken yet another shocking turn, with the former Chongqing Communist Party boss purged and his wife arrested on suspicion of murder.
Not so long ago, Mr Bo was poised for a place on the top-most rung of power in China. But last month, the first jolt came with news of his sacking as Chongqing party chief. Then came the announcement on Tuesday night that he had been suspended from the Politburo and that his wife, Madam Gu Kailai, was being investigated over the death of Briton Neil Heywood.
The dramatic manner of Mr Bo’s downfall has not only shattered the appearance of unity that the party has sought so hard to cultivate, ahead of a major power handover later this year, it has also highlighted the dire need for political reform.
Specifically, two fundamental flaws of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) one-party rule have been exposed in the way Mr Bo rose to power and the way he was brought down. Unless they are rectified, China will not escape future political upheavals.
The first has to do with the lack of checks and balances. Under the present set-up, the party boss, no matter at which level, enjoys near-absolute authority in his domain and is free to behave like a feudal lord in his manor if he so wishes.
In Mr Bo’s case, he had free rein to carry out his Maoist revival project, with his base in Chongqing used as a test bed and showcase.
Without any institutional checks, Mr Bo was able to do much as he pleased to make his Maoist model work. In his three-year tenure in Chongqing, he purged more than 3,000 officials in order to get the rank and file to toe his line.
That an individual so ruthless in his ascent to power came so close to clinching a spot in the elite party’s Standing Committee says much about the vulnerability of a system without proper institutional safeguards.
That lack of built-in checks is related to the second serious flaw in the CCP system: its continued inability to find a way to transfer power in a peaceful and stable manner.
Chairman Mao Zedong’s succession plans in 1969 (with Lin Biao as his heir apparent) and in 1976 (with Hua Guofeng his second designated heir) failed dismally. Lin died in 1971 when his plane crashed in Mongolia, following what appeared to be a failed coup to oust Mao. Hua was outmanoeuvred by Deng Xiaoping in a political struggle after Mao’s death and forced into early retirement.
After the trauma of the Tiananmen protests and subsequent crackdown in 1989, Deng was able to successfully install Mr Jiang Zemin as his successor and arrange for Mr Hu Jintao to take over from Mr Jiang after that.
But Deng was able to dictate the terms of succession only because of the sheer strength of his personal authority.
Following in Deng’s footsteps, Mr Jiang tried to do likewise, anointing Mr Xi Jinping as the successor to current President Hu.
But Mr Jiang lacks Deng’s unique clout, and this is where the system of hand-picked successors starts to wobble.
With no proper established guidelines on who makes it to the top, there is nothing to stop ambitious men like Mr Bo from challenging the choice of leaders as well as the authority of the incoming top boss, Mr Xi. It is therefore unsurprising that Mrs Bo’s wife was quoted as having said publicly: ‘Why Xi? Bo is equally good.’
Clearly, a power succession system that is so dependent on the personal charisma of its leader is unsustainable. It leaves the handover open to backroom deals, scheming and plotting and the hazards that come with dangerous power play.
For instance, Mr Wang Lijun, Mr Bo’s former right-hand man, was reported to have disclosed plans by the former Chongqing party chief to ally himself with Mr Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee, to prevent Mr Xi from taking over the top party post.
At the root of it all, whether it is the problem of arbitrary rule by local party chieftains or the problem of tumultuous transfers of power, lies one critical shortcoming: The CCP is governed by the rule of man, not of law.
Until the party acknowledges that weakness and does something about it, political instability and turmoil will continue to afflict the party and the state.
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Checks and balances lacking
CCP must find way to transfer power in a stable manner
By Ching Cheong
12 April 2012
The Bo Xilai saga has taken yet another shocking turn, with the former Chongqing Communist Party boss purged and his wife arrested on suspicion of murder.
Not so long ago, Mr Bo was poised for a place on the top-most rung of power in China. But last month, the first jolt came with news of his sacking as Chongqing party chief. Then came the announcement on Tuesday night that he had been suspended from the Politburo and that his wife, Madam Gu Kailai, was being investigated over the death of Briton Neil Heywood.
The dramatic manner of Mr Bo’s downfall has not only shattered the appearance of unity that the party has sought so hard to cultivate, ahead of a major power handover later this year, it has also highlighted the dire need for political reform.
Specifically, two fundamental flaws of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) one-party rule have been exposed in the way Mr Bo rose to power and the way he was brought down. Unless they are rectified, China will not escape future political upheavals.
The first has to do with the lack of checks and balances. Under the present set-up, the party boss, no matter at which level, enjoys near-absolute authority in his domain and is free to behave like a feudal lord in his manor if he so wishes.
In Mr Bo’s case, he had free rein to carry out his Maoist revival project, with his base in Chongqing used as a test bed and showcase.
Without any institutional checks, Mr Bo was able to do much as he pleased to make his Maoist model work. In his three-year tenure in Chongqing, he purged more than 3,000 officials in order to get the rank and file to toe his line.
That an individual so ruthless in his ascent to power came so close to clinching a spot in the elite party’s Standing Committee says much about the vulnerability of a system without proper institutional safeguards.
That lack of built-in checks is related to the second serious flaw in the CCP system: its continued inability to find a way to transfer power in a peaceful and stable manner.
Chairman Mao Zedong’s succession plans in 1969 (with Lin Biao as his heir apparent) and in 1976 (with Hua Guofeng his second designated heir) failed dismally. Lin died in 1971 when his plane crashed in Mongolia, following what appeared to be a failed coup to oust Mao. Hua was outmanoeuvred by Deng Xiaoping in a political struggle after Mao’s death and forced into early retirement.
After the trauma of the Tiananmen protests and subsequent crackdown in 1989, Deng was able to successfully install Mr Jiang Zemin as his successor and arrange for Mr Hu Jintao to take over from Mr Jiang after that.
But Deng was able to dictate the terms of succession only because of the sheer strength of his personal authority.
Following in Deng’s footsteps, Mr Jiang tried to do likewise, anointing Mr Xi Jinping as the successor to current President Hu.
But Mr Jiang lacks Deng’s unique clout, and this is where the system of hand-picked successors starts to wobble.
With no proper established guidelines on who makes it to the top, there is nothing to stop ambitious men like Mr Bo from challenging the choice of leaders as well as the authority of the incoming top boss, Mr Xi. It is therefore unsurprising that Mrs Bo’s wife was quoted as having said publicly: ‘Why Xi? Bo is equally good.’
Clearly, a power succession system that is so dependent on the personal charisma of its leader is unsustainable. It leaves the handover open to backroom deals, scheming and plotting and the hazards that come with dangerous power play.
For instance, Mr Wang Lijun, Mr Bo’s former right-hand man, was reported to have disclosed plans by the former Chongqing party chief to ally himself with Mr Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Standing Committee, to prevent Mr Xi from taking over the top party post.
At the root of it all, whether it is the problem of arbitrary rule by local party chieftains or the problem of tumultuous transfers of power, lies one critical shortcoming: The CCP is governed by the rule of man, not of law.
Until the party acknowledges that weakness and does something about it, political instability and turmoil will continue to afflict the party and the state.
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