Many have a stake in ensuring social stability, and seek to protect and expand their share
By Ching Cheong 22 June 2011
In less than a month, between May 26 and June 11, Beijing has had to deal with four major incidents - suicide bombings of government buildings in Fuzhou and Tianjin, riots in Inner Mongolia and another outbreak of mass unrest in Zengcheng, Guangdong.
In the latest bout of unrest, riot police had to be called out in Taizhou, Zhejiang province, last week after clashes broke out over land compensation issues.
The riot in Zengcheng, a satellite town of affluent Guangzhou city, is noteworthy as it shows how easily a small chance event can set off a groundswell of resentment into open violence. All it took was news that a pregnant migrant worker had been knocked down during a raid on illegal hawkers. Rumours of her death brought out all the deep-seated antagonism of other migrant workers against government officials.
The riot was put down only after three days, by the combined might of more than 3,000 military policemen.
How did it come to this, that despite record-high government spending on internal security, China is still having to fight these brush fires of social unrest?
The answer may be found in an observation made in a Qinghua University report on social management last year - that the methods used to maintain stability tend to breed even greater instability.
A recent investigative report by two journalists from Caijing Magazine reached the same conclusion. According to the report, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has gone to great lengths to build a state machinery to contain social unrest.
At the apex is the Central Leading Group for Stability Preservation (CLGSP), headed by Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, one of the nine most powerful men in China.
The CLGSP works through the Central Political-Legal Committee, which in turn sets policy guidelines for the ministries for public and national security, the courts and the police. The CLGSP also runs a committee specialising in social management.
This cumbersome framework is replicated at the municipal and provincial levels.
At the grassroots level, a three-tier network is created in all counties. These comprise a county-level office that handles ‘difficult issues’, town-level offices that handle ‘major issues’ and village-level offices that handle ‘minor issues’.
The report cited Yun’an county in Guangdong province as an example. This small county has a population of 320,000. But it has one county-level, eight town-level and 121 village-level centres for keeping social order.
Of its 6,700 government employees, about 1,800, or roughly a quarter, are tasked with maintaining stability, making it the No.1 de facto task of the county government.
This huge organisational structure from central, provincial to local levels of government explains why the budget for internal stability has rocketed in recent years.
What is more, since 2008, the CCP has had a policy linking the promotion of cadres to the maintenance of social stability. So, if an aggrieved petitioner from outside Beijing succeeds in lodging his complaint with the central government, the party and government boss of the area from which he hails will not get promoted, no matter how well they have performed in other aspects of work. This is the so-called ‘one-case-vetoes-all’ policy.
According to Caijing, local officials have responded with at least three ways of ‘buying stability’.
The first is to dispatch personnel to Beijing to intercept petitioners. Very often, this is the main task of liaison offices of the various provinces based in the capital.
The second is to contract out the task of intercepting petitioners to private security companies. For example, the Anyuanding Co, an outfit with a strong Public Security Ministry background, has petitioner-interception contracts with 19 provincial-level governments.
And if the petitioner somehow succeeds in eluding all interception attempts, the local authority has to resort to the third means, namely bribe the central officials in order to de-register the complaint. This is called a ‘payoff’, in official jargon.
The report quoted an official of Song county in Henan province as saying: ‘Payoffs are only economic expenses, but failing to make payments will damage one’s political future.’
Caijing’s conclusion: To maintain the appearance that all is well locally, a huge ‘stability-preservation’ market has developed that involves liaison offices, interception contracts and payoffs. All types of rent-seekers, brokers and even thugs have a stake in it, and continually seek ways to protect and expand the ‘stability-preservation pie’.
In other words, there is a vicious circle here, whereby efforts to clamp down on grievances result in even more effort being expended to ensure social stability.
What is to be done? The report recommended reforming the judicial system, the idea being that a more responsive, efficient and fair judiciary will act as a pressure valve.
Expanding democracy will also help to tackle instability at its root, Caijing added. The hope is that there is less incentive to torch buildings and smash police vehicles if people’s voices are heard and their views taken into account.
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Efforts to quell China unrest a vicious circle
Many have a stake in ensuring social stability, and seek to protect and expand their share
By Ching Cheong
22 June 2011
In less than a month, between May 26 and June 11, Beijing has had to deal with four major incidents - suicide bombings of government buildings in Fuzhou and Tianjin, riots in Inner Mongolia and another outbreak of mass unrest in Zengcheng, Guangdong.
In the latest bout of unrest, riot police had to be called out in Taizhou, Zhejiang province, last week after clashes broke out over land compensation issues.
The riot in Zengcheng, a satellite town of affluent Guangzhou city, is noteworthy as it shows how easily a small chance event can set off a groundswell of resentment into open violence. All it took was news that a pregnant migrant worker had been knocked down during a raid on illegal hawkers. Rumours of her death brought out all the deep-seated antagonism of other migrant workers against government officials.
The riot was put down only after three days, by the combined might of more than 3,000 military policemen.
How did it come to this, that despite record-high government spending on internal security, China is still having to fight these brush fires of social unrest?
The answer may be found in an observation made in a Qinghua University report on social management last year - that the methods used to maintain stability tend to breed even greater instability.
A recent investigative report by two journalists from Caijing Magazine reached the same conclusion. According to the report, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has gone to great lengths to build a state machinery to contain social unrest.
At the apex is the Central Leading Group for Stability Preservation (CLGSP), headed by Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang, one of the nine most powerful men in China.
The CLGSP works through the Central Political-Legal Committee, which in turn sets policy guidelines for the ministries for public and national security, the courts and the police. The CLGSP also runs a committee specialising in social management.
This cumbersome framework is replicated at the municipal and provincial levels.
At the grassroots level, a three-tier network is created in all counties. These comprise a county-level office that handles ‘difficult issues’, town-level offices that handle ‘major issues’ and village-level offices that handle ‘minor issues’.
The report cited Yun’an county in Guangdong province as an example. This small county has a population of 320,000. But it has one county-level, eight town-level and 121 village-level centres for keeping social order.
Of its 6,700 government employees, about 1,800, or roughly a quarter, are tasked with maintaining stability, making it the No.1 de facto task of the county government.
This huge organisational structure from central, provincial to local levels of government explains why the budget for internal stability has rocketed in recent years.
What is more, since 2008, the CCP has had a policy linking the promotion of cadres to the maintenance of social stability. So, if an aggrieved petitioner from outside Beijing succeeds in lodging his complaint with the central government, the party and government boss of the area from which he hails will not get promoted, no matter how well they have performed in other aspects of work. This is the so-called ‘one-case-vetoes-all’ policy.
According to Caijing, local officials have responded with at least three ways of ‘buying stability’.
The first is to dispatch personnel to Beijing to intercept petitioners. Very often, this is the main task of liaison offices of the various provinces based in the capital.
The second is to contract out the task of intercepting petitioners to private security companies. For example, the Anyuanding Co, an outfit with a strong Public Security Ministry background, has petitioner-interception contracts with 19 provincial-level governments.
And if the petitioner somehow succeeds in eluding all interception attempts, the local authority has to resort to the third means, namely bribe the central officials in order to de-register the complaint. This is called a ‘payoff’, in official jargon.
The report quoted an official of Song county in Henan province as saying: ‘Payoffs are only economic expenses, but failing to make payments will damage one’s political future.’
Caijing’s conclusion: To maintain the appearance that all is well locally, a huge ‘stability-preservation’ market has developed that involves liaison offices, interception contracts and payoffs. All types of rent-seekers, brokers and even thugs have a stake in it, and continually seek ways to protect and expand the ‘stability-preservation pie’.
In other words, there is a vicious circle here, whereby efforts to clamp down on grievances result in even more effort being expended to ensure social stability.
What is to be done? The report recommended reforming the judicial system, the idea being that a more responsive, efficient and fair judiciary will act as a pressure valve.
Expanding democracy will also help to tackle instability at its root, Caijing added. The hope is that there is less incentive to torch buildings and smash police vehicles if people’s voices are heard and their views taken into account.
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