Strategic mistrust at the core of US-China relations
Suspicions about arms spending, containment fears underpin their ties
By Chua Chin Hon 08 October 2009
The complex relationship between the United States and China has always defied easy categorisation.
Over the years, scholars and diplomats have nonetheless tried to formulate intellectual frameworks that accounted not only for the current state of relations, but more importantly, to provide a road map for the future.
One particular framework that caught on in recent years was Washington’s call for Beijing to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’.
First mooted by then deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick in September 2005, the argument was that China, having reaped the benefits of being part of the US-led international system for the last 30 years, had a responsibility to help sustain the system - as a ‘stakeholder’.
Beijing’s response was tepid at first. But Chinese leaders eventually warmed up to the idea, seeing it as an acknowledgement of the mainland’s growing status and power.
A few weeks ago, another senior US diplomat offered the Obama administration’s own take on the rapidly evolving US-China ties, calling for ‘strategic reassurance” in the bilateral relationship.
‘Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain,’ current Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said in a speech late last month, nearly four years after Mr. Zoellick’s speech.
‘Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s arrival as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.’
He cited a long list of concerns, ranging from China’s military expansion to its massive export sector and the country’s ‘mercantilist approach’ towards acquiring resources and energy.
‘Part of this assurance comes from sustained dialogue,’ said Mr. Steinberg. ‘But if our efforts are truly to be successful, they must go beyond words to actions that reassure. We must each take specific steps to address and allay each other’s concerns.’
The academic-turned-diplomat, however, did not spell out in detail what these ‘actions’ might consist of - setting the stage perhaps for President Barack Obama to expound further on the topic when he visits China next month.
So what does this shift from ‘responsible stakeholder’ to ‘strategic reassurance’ mean? Does the shift have real policy implications? Or is it merely a rhetorical tick, a means for the Obama administration to distinguish its China policy from the Bush administration’s?
Experts here say the latter is more likely, adding that they do not expect any imminent policy overhaul.
‘No administration wants to appear as if it has no imagination or long-term vision, so they would try for something new,’ said Professor Li Cheng, a China expert with the Brookings Institution.
He and others acknowledge, though, that Mr. Steinberg’s thesis does accurately point out the real nub of the problem in US-China ties: strategic mistrust.
Despite their growing ties and inter-dependence, both countries continue to eye each other’s long-term objectives with suspicion. Many in Beijing believe, for instance, that Washington wants to contain China’s rise by denying it access to markets, energy sources and high-end technology.
Meanwhile, the US continues to hedge against China and spies on its activities despite Beijing’s repeated assurances about its ‘peaceful rise’.
‘Strategic reassurance’ may yet damp down the zero-sum rivalries between the two powers. But the obvious flaws in the formulation suggest that it may be useful only as an interim measure.
For one thing, there is simply no way to eradicate or overcome the mistrust between the two powers. ‘It’s a natural and inherent part of big-power relationships,’ as Mr. Charles Freeman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies pointed out.
The issue is further complicated by the changing nature of the assurances that both countries seek from each other.
At the top of Mr. Steinberg’s list of ‘continued areas of mistrust and disagreement’ is Washington’s longstanding concern about Beijing’s increased arms spending and its military activities in Asia.
This cannot be more different from the No. 1 assurance that the Chinese leadership seeks from the White House these days: sound economic management. China has over US$2 trillion (S$2.7 trillion) in its foreign reserves, and is worried that the runaway US fiscal deficit would spark inflation and eventually hurt the value of its US dollar-denominated holdings.
However, the biggest problem, experts say, is that ‘reassurance” might be too narrow a way of thinking about the future state of US-China relations.
‘In the long term, there needs to be a serious discussion about partnership,’ noted Prof Li. ‘I do not think that ‘strategic reassurance’ will be a long-term phrase to characterise the relationship.’
Talk of a Group of Two (G-2) partnership between the US and China is much in vogue these days, premised on the argument that no global challenge can be solved without these two countries joining hands. But critics have derided G-2 as mere wishful thinking that conveniently ignores the differences and lingering suspicion between the two powers.
So just what would a realistic partnership between the US and China look like? There are no good answers at the moment. But one suspects that Mr. Zoellick’s ‘responsible stakeholder’ concept may yet prove to be the more influential idea in the long run.
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Strategic mistrust at the core of US-China relations
Suspicions about arms spending, containment fears underpin their ties
By Chua Chin Hon
08 October 2009
The complex relationship between the United States and China has always defied easy categorisation.
Over the years, scholars and diplomats have nonetheless tried to formulate intellectual frameworks that accounted not only for the current state of relations, but more importantly, to provide a road map for the future.
One particular framework that caught on in recent years was Washington’s call for Beijing to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’.
First mooted by then deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick in September 2005, the argument was that China, having reaped the benefits of being part of the US-led international system for the last 30 years, had a responsibility to help sustain the system - as a ‘stakeholder’.
Beijing’s response was tepid at first. But Chinese leaders eventually warmed up to the idea, seeing it as an acknowledgement of the mainland’s growing status and power.
A few weeks ago, another senior US diplomat offered the Obama administration’s own take on the rapidly evolving US-China ties, calling for ‘strategic reassurance” in the bilateral relationship.
‘Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain,’ current Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg said in a speech late last month, nearly four years after Mr. Zoellick’s speech.
‘Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s arrival as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others.’
He cited a long list of concerns, ranging from China’s military expansion to its massive export sector and the country’s ‘mercantilist approach’ towards acquiring resources and energy.
‘Part of this assurance comes from sustained dialogue,’ said Mr. Steinberg. ‘But if our efforts are truly to be successful, they must go beyond words to actions that reassure. We must each take specific steps to address and allay each other’s concerns.’
The academic-turned-diplomat, however, did not spell out in detail what these ‘actions’ might consist of - setting the stage perhaps for President Barack Obama to expound further on the topic when he visits China next month.
So what does this shift from ‘responsible stakeholder’ to ‘strategic reassurance’ mean? Does the shift have real policy implications? Or is it merely a rhetorical tick, a means for the Obama administration to distinguish its China policy from the Bush administration’s?
Experts here say the latter is more likely, adding that they do not expect any imminent policy overhaul.
‘No administration wants to appear as if it has no imagination or long-term vision, so they would try for something new,’ said Professor Li Cheng, a China expert with the Brookings Institution.
He and others acknowledge, though, that Mr. Steinberg’s thesis does accurately point out the real nub of the problem in US-China ties: strategic mistrust.
Despite their growing ties and inter-dependence, both countries continue to eye each other’s long-term objectives with suspicion. Many in Beijing believe, for instance, that Washington wants to contain China’s rise by denying it access to markets, energy sources and high-end technology.
Meanwhile, the US continues to hedge against China and spies on its activities despite Beijing’s repeated assurances about its ‘peaceful rise’.
‘Strategic reassurance’ may yet damp down the zero-sum rivalries between the two powers. But the obvious flaws in the formulation suggest that it may be useful only as an interim measure.
For one thing, there is simply no way to eradicate or overcome the mistrust between the two powers. ‘It’s a natural and inherent part of big-power relationships,’ as Mr. Charles Freeman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies pointed out.
The issue is further complicated by the changing nature of the assurances that both countries seek from each other.
At the top of Mr. Steinberg’s list of ‘continued areas of mistrust and disagreement’ is Washington’s longstanding concern about Beijing’s increased arms spending and its military activities in Asia.
This cannot be more different from the No. 1 assurance that the Chinese leadership seeks from the White House these days: sound economic management. China has over US$2 trillion (S$2.7 trillion) in its foreign reserves, and is worried that the runaway US fiscal deficit would spark inflation and eventually hurt the value of its US dollar-denominated holdings.
However, the biggest problem, experts say, is that ‘reassurance” might be too narrow a way of thinking about the future state of US-China relations.
‘In the long term, there needs to be a serious discussion about partnership,’ noted Prof Li. ‘I do not think that ‘strategic reassurance’ will be a long-term phrase to characterise the relationship.’
Talk of a Group of Two (G-2) partnership between the US and China is much in vogue these days, premised on the argument that no global challenge can be solved without these two countries joining hands. But critics have derided G-2 as mere wishful thinking that conveniently ignores the differences and lingering suspicion between the two powers.
So just what would a realistic partnership between the US and China look like? There are no good answers at the moment. But one suspects that Mr. Zoellick’s ‘responsible stakeholder’ concept may yet prove to be the more influential idea in the long run.
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