When someone shares with you something of value, you have an obligation to share it with others.
Saturday, 29 November 2008
The Deadly Dirty D-Words: “Deflation”, “Debt Deflation” and “Defaults”
The Deadly Dirty D-Words: “Deflation”, “Debt Deflation” and “Defaults”. And How Central Banks Will Have to Resort to “Crazy” Policies as We Have Reached Such Bermuda Triangle of a “Liquidity Trap”
The Deadly Dirty D-Words: “Deflation”, “Debt Deflation” and “Defaults”. And How Central Banks Will Have to Resort to “Crazy” Policies as We Have Reached Such Bermuda Triangle of a “Liquidity Trap”
Nouriel Roubini 21 November 2008
I have been warning since January 2008 that the biggest risk ahead for the US and the global economy is one of a stag-deflation, the deadly combination of an economic stagnation/recession and deflation.
Let me discuss the details of this toxic mixture of deflation, liquidity trap, debt deflation and rising household and corporate defaults:
We Are Close to Deflation and Stag-Deflation
First of all, signs of stag-deflation now are clear: we are in a severe recession and now the recent readings of both the PPI and the CPI are showing the beginning of deflation. Slack in goods markets with demand falling and supply being excessive (because of years of excessive overinvestment in new capacity in China, Asia and emerging market economies) means lower pricing power of firms and need to cut prices to sell the burgeoning inventory of unsold goods; slack in labour markets with sharp fall in employment and sharp rise in the unemployment rate means lower wage pressures and lower labour cost pressures; and slack in commodity markets – that have already fallen by 30% from their summer peaks and will fall another 20-30% in a global recession – means lower inflation and actual deflationary forces. Given a severe US and global recession deflation will soon be a reality in the US, Japan, Switzerland, UK and, down the line, even in the Eurozone and other economies.
The Risk of a Liquidity Trap
When deflation sets in central banks need to worry about it and worry about a liquidity trap. Take the example of the 2001 recession: that was a mild 8 months recession in the US and over by end of 2001. But by 2002 the US inflation rate had fallen towards 1% (effectively 0% or negative given imperfect measurement of hedonic prices) that the Fed was forced to cut the Fed Funds rate to 1% and Ben Bernanke - then a Fed Governor – was writing speeches titled “Deflation: Making Sure “It” Does Not Happen Here” meaning it would not happen in the US as Japan was already in a deflation at that time. So if a mild recession – that was not even global – led to deflation worries how severe deflation could be in a recession that even the IMF is now forecasting to be global in 2009?
When economies get close to deflation central banks aggressively cut policy rate but they are threatened by the liquidity trap that the zero bound on nominal policy rates implies. The Fed is now effectively already in a liquidity trap: the target Fed Funds rate is still 1% but expected to be cut to 0.5% in December and down to 0% by early 2009. Also, while the target rate is still 1% the effective Fed Funds rate has been trading close to 0.3% for several weeks now as the Fed has flooded money markets with massive liquidity injections; so we are effectively already close to the 0% constraint for the nominal policy rate.
Why should we worry about a liquidity trap? When policy rates are close to zero money and interest bearing short term government bonds become effectively perfectly substitutable (what is a zero interest rate bond? It is effectively like cash). Then further open market operations to increase the monetary base cannot reduce further the nominal interest rate and therefore monetary policy becomes ineffective in stimulating consumption, housing investment and capex spending by the corporate sector: you get stuck into a liquidity trap and more unorthodox monetary policy actions (to be discussed below) need to be undertaken.
The Costs and Dangers of Price Deflation
Before we discuss the monetary policy options in a deflation and liquidity trap let us consider the costs and dangers of deflation.
First, if aggregate demand falls sharply below aggregate supply then price deflation sets in (and indeed there is already massive price deflation in the US in the sectors – housing, autos/motor vehicles and consumer durables – where the excess inventory of unsold goods is huge). The fall in prices and the excess inventory of unsold goods forces firms to cut back production and employment; the ensuing fall in incomes leads to further fall in demand and induce another vicious cycle of falling prices and falling production/employment/income and demand.
Second, when there is deflation there is no incentive to consume/spend today as prices will be lower tomorrow: buying goods today is like catching a falling knife and there is an incentive to postpone spending (consumption and investment spending) until the future: why to buy a home or a car today if its price will fall another 15% and purchasing today would imply having one’s equity in a home or a car fully wiped out in a matter of months? Better to postpone spending. But this postponing of spending exacerbates the vicious cycle of falling demand and supply/employment/income and prices.
Third, when there is deflation real interest rate are high and rising in spite of the fact that nominal policy rates are zero. If the policy rate is zero and there is a 2% deflation the real short term policy rate is actually a positive 2% that further depresses consumption and investment; and real long-term market rates are even higher with deflation – as discussed in detail below – as market rates at which firms and households borrow are much higher than short term policy rates.
The Deadly Deeds of Debt Deflation
Fourth, deflation also leads to the nightmare of debt deflation, a situation well analyzed by Fisher during the Great Depression. If debt liabilities are in nominal terms (D) and at a fixed long term interest rate (i) a reduction in the price level (P) increases the real value of such nominal liabilities (D/P goes up); so debtors that are already distressed in a recession and deflation become even more distressed as the real burden of their liabilities (D/P) sharply rises.
Another complementary way to see the perverse effects of debt deflation is to notice that the ex-post – as opposed to the ex-ante –real interest rate faced by borrowers sharply rise. Suppose you are a firm or household that had borrowed – say a 10 year mortgage or a 10 year corporate bond – at an interest rate (i) of 5% at the time when inflation (dP/P) was expected to remain at 3%; then the real ex-ante real cost of borrowing (r= i – dP/P) was only 2% (the difference between 5% and the expected inflation of 3%). Now suppose that, ex-post, the economy falls into a deflation trap and prices are now falling at 2% annual rate and expected to fall as much for a number of years. Now the ex-post real interest rate (r= i – dP/P) on that borrowing rises from 2% ex-ante to an actual ex-post 7% (5% - (-2%)). Thus, ex-post unexpected deflation sharply increases the real interest rate faced by borrowers or, equivalently, sharply increases the real ex-post value of their real liabilities (D/P).
Things are even worse if the debtor had borrowed to finance the leverage purchase of assets whose prices is now falling. Suppose you are a household who borrowed at a 5% mortgage rate to purchase a home whose price is now falling at an annual rate of 15%. Then the effective real interest rate that you are facing on your debt is not 5% but a whopping 20% (the sum of the 5% mortgage rate plus the 15% fall in the price of the underlying asset) that soon leads you into the depth of negative equity into your home. Thus, leveraged purchase of assets whose price is falling is an even more deadly form of debt deflation.
In all of its forms and manifestations debt deflation sharply increases the risk that borrowers will be forced to default on real obligations that they cannot service. Thus, debt deflation is associated with a sharp rise in corporate defaults and household defaults that creates a spiral of deflation, debt deflation and defaults.
High Market Real Interest Rates and Costs of Borrowing in a Deflation/Liquidity Trap
In situations of deflation and liquidity trap traditional monetary policy becomes pathetically ineffective. Consider now why monetary policy is ineffective. The real long-term interest rate faced by borrowers (say a mortgage holders who has a 10 year fixed rate mortgage or a corporate who issues a 10 year nominal rate bond) is given by the following expression:
Real Long Term Market Rate = (Nominal Long Term Market Yield – Inflation Rate) = (Nominal Long Term Market Yield – Long Term Government Bond Yield) + (Long Term Government Bond Yield – Fed Funds Rate) + Fed Funds Rate - Inflation Rate
Similarly the real short-term interest rate faced by borrowers (say a mortgage holder who has a variable rate mortgage or a consumer with credit card debt or a corporate who issues short term commercial paper) is given by the following expression:
Real Short Term Market Rate = (Nominal Short Term Market Yield – Inflation Rate) = (Nominal Short Term Market Yield – 3 month Libor rate) + (3 month Libor rate – Fed Funds Rate) + Fed Funds Rate - Inflation Rate
The first expression above shows clearly that even if the policy rate (the Fed Fund rate) is 0% the long term real interest rate faced by market borrowers can be very high for three reasons:
1. For any given nominal market rate there is deflation that increases real rates
2. The spread between the nominal market rate and the long term nominal yield on safe government bonds (representing the credit spread) can be high and rising
3. The spread between the nominal government bond yield and the policy rate (the yield curve spread) can be high and rising
A similar three-part decomposition holds for the short term real market rate that depends on deflation, on the spread between market rates and the short –term Libor rate and the spread between short term Libor and the policy rate.
Now, in a situation of a liquidity trap all three factors described above keep real long term market rates high and rising in spite of falling policy rates (that end up with the Fed Funds rate down to zero). First, the credit spread has widened for high yield corporates from 250bps in June of last year to a whopping 1600bps in recent days; even the credit spread for high grade corporate has gone from 50bps to 400-500bps. Second the spread between long term government bonds and the Fed Funds rate has sharply increased as the Fed Funds rate has been reduced from 5.25% to 1% (soon 0%) while long bond yields have fallen very little (about 100bps). Third, inflation is sharply falling and deflation is over the horizon.
The same holds for the sharp increase in real short term market rates since the beginning of the liquidity crunch in money markets and short term debt markets: a rise in the spread between market rates (say credit cards or commercial paper) and 3 month Libor; a rise in the spread between 2 month Libor and the policy rate (or variants of the same such as the TED spread or the Libor-OIS spread); a fall in inflation and the onset of deflation.
“Crazy” Monetary Policy to Address the Liquidity Trap and a Severe Liquidity and Credit Crunch
To address the increase in real short term market rates the Fed and other central banks have already undertaken quite unorthodox monetary policy moves. To address the even more severe increase in real long term market rates the Fed and other central banks will have to undertake even more radical and unorthodox policy actions.
The widening of the real short term market rates has been addressed by creating a whole series of new liquidity facilities (the TAF, the TSLF, the PDCF, the swap lines with foreign central banks, the new commercial paper facility). Some of these facilities have been aimed at reducing the sharply rising TED spread, Libor-OIS spread, Libor-Fed Funds spread. While other of these facilities – such as the new commercial paper facility (that has the acronym of ABCPMMMFLF) have had the aim of reducing the sharply rising spread between short-term market rates (such as commercial paper rates) and the policy rate (or the 3 month T-bill rate). Flooding money markets with massive amounts of liquidity and with a massive swap of illiquid assets sitting on the balance sheet of banks and broker dealers (MBS, etc.) for safe Treasuries has finally started – after 12 months of rising spreads – to reduce such Libor versus safe assets spread.
Indeed, the Fed and other central banks that used to be the “lenders of last resort” have become the “lenders of first and only resort” as banks don’t lend to each other, banks don’t lend to non-bank financial institutions and financial institutions don’t lend to the corporate and household sectors.
However, in spite of the Fed becoming the lender of first and only resort (even the corporate CP market is now being propped by the new Fed facility) there are still major problems that remain seriously unresolved in short term money markets and short term credit markets:
- Such Libor spreads are rising again in recent days; and they are still very high – at the 3 month maturity – compared to what they were before this liquidity crunch;
- banks and other financial institutions are still not lending to each other in spite of lower spreads as they need the liquidity received by the Fed and they worry about the solvency of their counterparties;
- only banks and major broker dealers have access to these facilities and thus most of the shadow banking system does not have access to this Fed liquidity;
- market spreads as still rising and the availability of short term credit is becoming tighter as banks increase interest rates on credit cards, student loans and auto loans and make such loans in scarcer supply;
- only rated investment grade corporate have access to the commercial paper facility leaving millions of speculative grade or non-rated firms in an even bigger liquidity and credit squeeze;
- securitization of credit cards, auto loans, student loans is currently dead.
This is why now a desperate Treasury is starting to think about using the remaining TARP funds to directly unclog the unsecured consumer debt (credit cards, student loans, auto loans) market and the securitization of such debt. Desperate times required desperate and extreme actions.
Even “Crazier” Policy Actions Are Required to Reduce Long Term Market Interest Rates
But even more desperate or “crazier” monetary actions are needed to address the increase in real long term market rates. These actions are needed to prevent deflation from setting in, to reduce the credit spread (the difference between long term market rates and long term government bond yields) and to reduce the yield curve spread (the difference between long term government bond yields and the policy rate).
There are a number of tools that the Fed could use to reduce the yield curve spread when the Fed Funds rate is already done to zero. First, the Fed could commit to maintain the Fed Funds rate down to zero for a long period of time: since long term government bond yields are – based on the expectation hypothesis – equal to a weighted average of current short term government bond yields and current expectations of what those short term bond yields will be for the foreseeable future a commitment to keep the Fed Funds rate down to zero for a long time will affect expectations of future expected short rates and could reduce long term government bond yields. Even this action may not be sufficient to reduce long yields on safe assets as such long yields also depend on liquidity premia and risk premia that will not be affected by expectation of future short rates. Greenspan discovered the “bond market conundrum” when raising the Fed Funds rate from 1% to 5.25% did not change much long rates and Bernanke rediscovered this conundrum when reducing the Fed Funds rate down to 1% failed to significantly reduce long rates. Such long rates depend in part on the global supply of savings relative to the demand for investment; thus they are not likely to be strongly affected by current and future expected policy rates.
Second, the Fed could do what it last did in the 1950s: directly purchase long term government bonds as a way of pushing downward their yield and thus reduce the yield curve spread. But even such action may not be very successful in world where such long rates depend as much as anything else on the global supply of savings relative to investment. Thus, even radical action such as outright Fed purchases of 10 or 30 year US Treasury bonds may not work as much as desired.
Next, the Fed could try to directly affect the credit spread (the spread between long term market rates and long term government bond yields). Radical actions could take the form of: outright purchases of corporate bonds (high yield and high grade); outright purchases of mortgages and private and agency MBS as well as agency debt; forcing Fannie and Freddie to vastly expand their portfolios by buying and/or guaranteeing more mortgages and bundles of mortgages; one could decide to directly subsidize mortgages with fiscal resources; the Fed (or Treasury) could even go as far as directly intervening in the stock market via direct purchases of equities as a way to boost falling equity prices. Some of such policy actions seem extreme but they were in the playbook that Governor Bernanke described in his 2002 speech on how to avoid deflation. They all imply serious risks for the Fed and concerns about market manipulation. Such risks include the losses that the Fed could incur in purchasing long term private securities, especially high yield junk bonds of distressed corporations. In the commercial paper fund the Fed refused to purchase non-investment grade securities. Even high grade corporate bonds are not without risk as their spread have massively widened in recent months from 50bps over Treasuries to levels in the 500bps plus range. Also pushing the insolvent Fannie and Freddie to take even more credit risk may be a reckless policy choice. And having a government trying to manipulate stock prices would create another whole can of worms of conflicts and distortions.
Finally, the Fed could try to follow aggressive policies to attempt to prevent deflation from setting in: massive quantitative easing; flooding markets with unlimited unsterilized liquidity; talking down the value of the dollar; direct and massive intervention in the forex to weaken the dollar; vast increase of the swap lines with foreign central banks (an indirect and disguised form of forex intervention) aimed to prevent a strengthening of the dollar; attempts to target the price level or the inflation rate via aggressive preemptive monetization; or even a money-financed budget deficit (an idea suggested by Bernanke in 2002 that he termed to be the equivalent of an “helicopter drop” of money in the economy). The problem with many of these “extreme” policy actions – as well as some of the ones described above to affect the relevant spreads – is that they were tried in Japan in the 1990s and the last few years and they miserably failed: once you are in a liquidity trap and there are fundamental deflationary forces in the economy as the excess aggregate supply of goods is facing a falling aggregate demand it is very hard even with extreme policy actions to prevent deflations from emerging.
Some very aggressive policy actions – such as letting the dollar weaken sharply – may do the job but they may also be beggar-thy-neighbor policies that would export even more deflation to other countries: a much weaker dollar would mean a much stronger value of other currencies that would reduce aggregate demand abroad and exacerbate their deflationary pressures as their import prices would sharply fall.
And indeed with global – rather than U.S. alone – deflationary forces setting in the global economy dealing with global deflation becomes much harder. The world economy has been massively imbalanced for the last decade with the U.S. being the consumer of first and last resort, spending more than its income and running ever larger current account deficits while creating a massive excess productive capacity via overinvestment; while China and other emerging markets have been the producers of first and last resort, spending less than their income and running ever larger current account surpluses. With U.S. spending (consumption, residential investment, capex spending) now faltering and structural rigidities to a rapid growth of domestic consumption demand in China and emerging market economies, a global glut of unsold goods may lead to persistent and perverse deflationary forces that may last for a longer time unless proper policy actions – mostly non-necessarily monetary – are undertaken.
Thus, dealing with this deadly combination of deflation, liquidity traps, debt deflation and defaults that I termed as global stag-deflation may be the biggest challenge that U.S. and global policy makers may have to face in 2009. It will not be easy to prevent this toxic vicious circle unless the process of recapitalizing financial institutions via temporary partial nationalization of them is accelerated and performed in a consistent and credible way; unless such actions are combined with massive fiscal stimulus to prop up aggregate demand while private demand is in free fall; unless the debt burden of insolvent households is sharply reduced via outright large debt reduction (not cosmetic and ineffective “loan modifications”); and unless even more unorthodox and radical monetary policy actions are undertaken to prevent pervasive deflation from setting in.
Thus, while the Fed may pursue radical, “crazy” and “crazier” monetary policy actions the true policy responses to the risk of deflation may lie elsewhere: when monetary policy is in a liquidity trap a properly-targeted fiscal stimulus is more appropriate and effective; cleaning up the financial system and properly recapitalize it is necessary; and debt deflation and debt overhang problems are more directly and properly resolved through debt restructuring and debt reduction than by trying to reduce the real value of such liabilities via higher inflation.
1 comment:
The Deadly Dirty D-Words: “Deflation”, “Debt Deflation” and “Defaults”. And How Central Banks Will Have to Resort to “Crazy” Policies as We Have Reached Such Bermuda Triangle of a “Liquidity Trap”
Nouriel Roubini
21 November 2008
I have been warning since January 2008 that the biggest risk ahead for the US and the global economy is one of a stag-deflation, the deadly combination of an economic stagnation/recession and deflation.
Let me discuss the details of this toxic mixture of deflation, liquidity trap, debt deflation and rising household and corporate defaults:
We Are Close to Deflation and Stag-Deflation
First of all, signs of stag-deflation now are clear: we are in a severe recession and now the recent readings of both the PPI and the CPI are showing the beginning of deflation. Slack in goods markets with demand falling and supply being excessive (because of years of excessive overinvestment in new capacity in China, Asia and emerging market economies) means lower pricing power of firms and need to cut prices to sell the burgeoning inventory of unsold goods; slack in labour markets with sharp fall in employment and sharp rise in the unemployment rate means lower wage pressures and lower labour cost pressures; and slack in commodity markets – that have already fallen by 30% from their summer peaks and will fall another 20-30% in a global recession – means lower inflation and actual deflationary forces. Given a severe US and global recession deflation will soon be a reality in the US, Japan, Switzerland, UK and, down the line, even in the Eurozone and other economies.
The Risk of a Liquidity Trap
When deflation sets in central banks need to worry about it and worry about a liquidity trap. Take the example of the 2001 recession: that was a mild 8 months recession in the US and over by end of 2001. But by 2002 the US inflation rate had fallen towards 1% (effectively 0% or negative given imperfect measurement of hedonic prices) that the Fed was forced to cut the Fed Funds rate to 1% and Ben Bernanke - then a Fed Governor – was writing speeches titled “Deflation: Making Sure “It” Does Not Happen Here” meaning it would not happen in the US as Japan was already in a deflation at that time. So if a mild recession – that was not even global – led to deflation worries how severe deflation could be in a recession that even the IMF is now forecasting to be global in 2009?
When economies get close to deflation central banks aggressively cut policy rate but they are threatened by the liquidity trap that the zero bound on nominal policy rates implies. The Fed is now effectively already in a liquidity trap: the target Fed Funds rate is still 1% but expected to be cut to 0.5% in December and down to 0% by early 2009. Also, while the target rate is still 1% the effective Fed Funds rate has been trading close to 0.3% for several weeks now as the Fed has flooded money markets with massive liquidity injections; so we are effectively already close to the 0% constraint for the nominal policy rate.
Why should we worry about a liquidity trap? When policy rates are close to zero money and interest bearing short term government bonds become effectively perfectly substitutable (what is a zero interest rate bond? It is effectively like cash). Then further open market operations to increase the monetary base cannot reduce further the nominal interest rate and therefore monetary policy becomes ineffective in stimulating consumption, housing investment and capex spending by the corporate sector: you get stuck into a liquidity trap and more unorthodox monetary policy actions (to be discussed below) need to be undertaken.
The Costs and Dangers of Price Deflation
Before we discuss the monetary policy options in a deflation and liquidity trap let us consider the costs and dangers of deflation.
First, if aggregate demand falls sharply below aggregate supply then price deflation sets in (and indeed there is already massive price deflation in the US in the sectors – housing, autos/motor vehicles and consumer durables – where the excess inventory of unsold goods is huge). The fall in prices and the excess inventory of unsold goods forces firms to cut back production and employment; the ensuing fall in incomes leads to further fall in demand and induce another vicious cycle of falling prices and falling production/employment/income and demand.
Second, when there is deflation there is no incentive to consume/spend today as prices will be lower tomorrow: buying goods today is like catching a falling knife and there is an incentive to postpone spending (consumption and investment spending) until the future: why to buy a home or a car today if its price will fall another 15% and purchasing today would imply having one’s equity in a home or a car fully wiped out in a matter of months? Better to postpone spending. But this postponing of spending exacerbates the vicious cycle of falling demand and supply/employment/income and prices.
Third, when there is deflation real interest rate are high and rising in spite of the fact that nominal policy rates are zero. If the policy rate is zero and there is a 2% deflation the real short term policy rate is actually a positive 2% that further depresses consumption and investment; and real long-term market rates are even higher with deflation – as discussed in detail below – as market rates at which firms and households borrow are much higher than short term policy rates.
The Deadly Deeds of Debt Deflation
Fourth, deflation also leads to the nightmare of debt deflation, a situation well analyzed by Fisher during the Great Depression. If debt liabilities are in nominal terms (D) and at a fixed long term interest rate (i) a reduction in the price level (P) increases the real value of such nominal liabilities (D/P goes up); so debtors that are already distressed in a recession and deflation become even more distressed as the real burden of their liabilities (D/P) sharply rises.
Another complementary way to see the perverse effects of debt deflation is to notice that the ex-post – as opposed to the ex-ante –real interest rate faced by borrowers sharply rise. Suppose you are a firm or household that had borrowed – say a 10 year mortgage or a 10 year corporate bond – at an interest rate (i) of 5% at the time when inflation (dP/P) was expected to remain at 3%; then the real ex-ante real cost of borrowing (r= i – dP/P) was only 2% (the difference between 5% and the expected inflation of 3%). Now suppose that, ex-post, the economy falls into a deflation trap and prices are now falling at 2% annual rate and expected to fall as much for a number of years. Now the ex-post real interest rate (r= i – dP/P) on that borrowing rises from 2% ex-ante to an actual ex-post 7% (5% - (-2%)). Thus, ex-post unexpected deflation sharply increases the real interest rate faced by borrowers or, equivalently, sharply increases the real ex-post value of their real liabilities (D/P).
Things are even worse if the debtor had borrowed to finance the leverage purchase of assets whose prices is now falling. Suppose you are a household who borrowed at a 5% mortgage rate to purchase a home whose price is now falling at an annual rate of 15%. Then the effective real interest rate that you are facing on your debt is not 5% but a whopping 20% (the sum of the 5% mortgage rate plus the 15% fall in the price of the underlying asset) that soon leads you into the depth of negative equity into your home. Thus, leveraged purchase of assets whose price is falling is an even more deadly form of debt deflation.
In all of its forms and manifestations debt deflation sharply increases the risk that borrowers will be forced to default on real obligations that they cannot service. Thus, debt deflation is associated with a sharp rise in corporate defaults and household defaults that creates a spiral of deflation, debt deflation and defaults.
High Market Real Interest Rates and Costs of Borrowing in a Deflation/Liquidity Trap
In situations of deflation and liquidity trap traditional monetary policy becomes pathetically ineffective. Consider now why monetary policy is ineffective. The real long-term interest rate faced by borrowers (say a mortgage holders who has a 10 year fixed rate mortgage or a corporate who issues a 10 year nominal rate bond) is given by the following expression:
Real Long Term Market Rate = (Nominal Long Term Market Yield – Inflation Rate) = (Nominal Long Term Market Yield – Long Term Government Bond Yield) + (Long Term Government Bond Yield – Fed Funds Rate) + Fed Funds Rate - Inflation Rate
Similarly the real short-term interest rate faced by borrowers (say a mortgage holder who has a variable rate mortgage or a consumer with credit card debt or a corporate who issues short term commercial paper) is given by the following expression:
Real Short Term Market Rate = (Nominal Short Term Market Yield – Inflation Rate) = (Nominal Short Term Market Yield – 3 month Libor rate) + (3 month Libor rate – Fed Funds Rate) + Fed Funds Rate - Inflation Rate
The first expression above shows clearly that even if the policy rate (the Fed Fund rate) is 0% the long term real interest rate faced by market borrowers can be very high for three reasons:
1. For any given nominal market rate there is deflation that increases real rates
2. The spread between the nominal market rate and the long term nominal yield on safe government bonds (representing the credit spread) can be high and rising
3. The spread between the nominal government bond yield and the policy rate (the yield curve spread) can be high and rising
A similar three-part decomposition holds for the short term real market rate that depends on deflation, on the spread between market rates and the short –term Libor rate and the spread between short term Libor and the policy rate.
Now, in a situation of a liquidity trap all three factors described above keep real long term market rates high and rising in spite of falling policy rates (that end up with the Fed Funds rate down to zero). First, the credit spread has widened for high yield corporates from 250bps in June of last year to a whopping 1600bps in recent days; even the credit spread for high grade corporate has gone from 50bps to 400-500bps. Second the spread between long term government bonds and the Fed Funds rate has sharply increased as the Fed Funds rate has been reduced from 5.25% to 1% (soon 0%) while long bond yields have fallen very little (about 100bps). Third, inflation is sharply falling and deflation is over the horizon.
The same holds for the sharp increase in real short term market rates since the beginning of the liquidity crunch in money markets and short term debt markets: a rise in the spread between market rates (say credit cards or commercial paper) and 3 month Libor; a rise in the spread between 2 month Libor and the policy rate (or variants of the same such as the TED spread or the Libor-OIS spread); a fall in inflation and the onset of deflation.
“Crazy” Monetary Policy to Address the Liquidity Trap and a Severe Liquidity and Credit Crunch
To address the increase in real short term market rates the Fed and other central banks have already undertaken quite unorthodox monetary policy moves. To address the even more severe increase in real long term market rates the Fed and other central banks will have to undertake even more radical and unorthodox policy actions.
The widening of the real short term market rates has been addressed by creating a whole series of new liquidity facilities (the TAF, the TSLF, the PDCF, the swap lines with foreign central banks, the new commercial paper facility). Some of these facilities have been aimed at reducing the sharply rising TED spread, Libor-OIS spread, Libor-Fed Funds spread. While other of these facilities – such as the new commercial paper facility (that has the acronym of ABCPMMMFLF) have had the aim of reducing the sharply rising spread between short-term market rates (such as commercial paper rates) and the policy rate (or the 3 month T-bill rate). Flooding money markets with massive amounts of liquidity and with a massive swap of illiquid assets sitting on the balance sheet of banks and broker dealers (MBS, etc.) for safe Treasuries has finally started – after 12 months of rising spreads – to reduce such Libor versus safe assets spread.
Indeed, the Fed and other central banks that used to be the “lenders of last resort” have become the “lenders of first and only resort” as banks don’t lend to each other, banks don’t lend to non-bank financial institutions and financial institutions don’t lend to the corporate and household sectors.
However, in spite of the Fed becoming the lender of first and only resort (even the corporate CP market is now being propped by the new Fed facility) there are still major problems that remain seriously unresolved in short term money markets and short term credit markets:
- Such Libor spreads are rising again in recent days; and they are still very high – at the 3 month maturity – compared to what they were before this liquidity crunch;
- banks and other financial institutions are still not lending to each other in spite of lower spreads as they need the liquidity received by the Fed and they worry about the solvency of their counterparties;
- only banks and major broker dealers have access to these facilities and thus most of the shadow banking system does not have access to this Fed liquidity;
- market spreads as still rising and the availability of short term credit is becoming tighter as banks increase interest rates on credit cards, student loans and auto loans and make such loans in scarcer supply;
- only rated investment grade corporate have access to the commercial paper facility leaving millions of speculative grade or non-rated firms in an even bigger liquidity and credit squeeze;
- securitization of credit cards, auto loans, student loans is currently dead.
This is why now a desperate Treasury is starting to think about using the remaining TARP funds to directly unclog the unsecured consumer debt (credit cards, student loans, auto loans) market and the securitization of such debt. Desperate times required desperate and extreme actions.
Even “Crazier” Policy Actions Are Required to Reduce Long Term Market Interest Rates
But even more desperate or “crazier” monetary actions are needed to address the increase in real long term market rates. These actions are needed to prevent deflation from setting in, to reduce the credit spread (the difference between long term market rates and long term government bond yields) and to reduce the yield curve spread (the difference between long term government bond yields and the policy rate).
There are a number of tools that the Fed could use to reduce the yield curve spread when the Fed Funds rate is already done to zero. First, the Fed could commit to maintain the Fed Funds rate down to zero for a long period of time: since long term government bond yields are – based on the expectation hypothesis – equal to a weighted average of current short term government bond yields and current expectations of what those short term bond yields will be for the foreseeable future a commitment to keep the Fed Funds rate down to zero for a long time will affect expectations of future expected short rates and could reduce long term government bond yields. Even this action may not be sufficient to reduce long yields on safe assets as such long yields also depend on liquidity premia and risk premia that will not be affected by expectation of future short rates. Greenspan discovered the “bond market conundrum” when raising the Fed Funds rate from 1% to 5.25% did not change much long rates and Bernanke rediscovered this conundrum when reducing the Fed Funds rate down to 1% failed to significantly reduce long rates. Such long rates depend in part on the global supply of savings relative to the demand for investment; thus they are not likely to be strongly affected by current and future expected policy rates.
Second, the Fed could do what it last did in the 1950s: directly purchase long term government bonds as a way of pushing downward their yield and thus reduce the yield curve spread. But even such action may not be very successful in world where such long rates depend as much as anything else on the global supply of savings relative to investment. Thus, even radical action such as outright Fed purchases of 10 or 30 year US Treasury bonds may not work as much as desired.
Next, the Fed could try to directly affect the credit spread (the spread between long term market rates and long term government bond yields). Radical actions could take the form of: outright purchases of corporate bonds (high yield and high grade); outright purchases of mortgages and private and agency MBS as well as agency debt; forcing Fannie and Freddie to vastly expand their portfolios by buying and/or guaranteeing more mortgages and bundles of mortgages; one could decide to directly subsidize mortgages with fiscal resources; the Fed (or Treasury) could even go as far as directly intervening in the stock market via direct purchases of equities as a way to boost falling equity prices. Some of such policy actions seem extreme but they were in the playbook that Governor Bernanke described in his 2002 speech on how to avoid deflation. They all imply serious risks for the Fed and concerns about market manipulation. Such risks include the losses that the Fed could incur in purchasing long term private securities, especially high yield junk bonds of distressed corporations. In the commercial paper fund the Fed refused to purchase non-investment grade securities. Even high grade corporate bonds are not without risk as their spread have massively widened in recent months from 50bps over Treasuries to levels in the 500bps plus range. Also pushing the insolvent Fannie and Freddie to take even more credit risk may be a reckless policy choice. And having a government trying to manipulate stock prices would create another whole can of worms of conflicts and distortions.
Finally, the Fed could try to follow aggressive policies to attempt to prevent deflation from setting in: massive quantitative easing; flooding markets with unlimited unsterilized liquidity; talking down the value of the dollar; direct and massive intervention in the forex to weaken the dollar; vast increase of the swap lines with foreign central banks (an indirect and disguised form of forex intervention) aimed to prevent a strengthening of the dollar; attempts to target the price level or the inflation rate via aggressive preemptive monetization; or even a money-financed budget deficit (an idea suggested by Bernanke in 2002 that he termed to be the equivalent of an “helicopter drop” of money in the economy). The problem with many of these “extreme” policy actions – as well as some of the ones described above to affect the relevant spreads – is that they were tried in Japan in the 1990s and the last few years and they miserably failed: once you are in a liquidity trap and there are fundamental deflationary forces in the economy as the excess aggregate supply of goods is facing a falling aggregate demand it is very hard even with extreme policy actions to prevent deflations from emerging.
Some very aggressive policy actions – such as letting the dollar weaken sharply – may do the job but they may also be beggar-thy-neighbor policies that would export even more deflation to other countries: a much weaker dollar would mean a much stronger value of other currencies that would reduce aggregate demand abroad and exacerbate their deflationary pressures as their import prices would sharply fall.
And indeed with global – rather than U.S. alone – deflationary forces setting in the global economy dealing with global deflation becomes much harder. The world economy has been massively imbalanced for the last decade with the U.S. being the consumer of first and last resort, spending more than its income and running ever larger current account deficits while creating a massive excess productive capacity via overinvestment; while China and other emerging markets have been the producers of first and last resort, spending less than their income and running ever larger current account surpluses. With U.S. spending (consumption, residential investment, capex spending) now faltering and structural rigidities to a rapid growth of domestic consumption demand in China and emerging market economies, a global glut of unsold goods may lead to persistent and perverse deflationary forces that may last for a longer time unless proper policy actions – mostly non-necessarily monetary – are undertaken.
Thus, dealing with this deadly combination of deflation, liquidity traps, debt deflation and defaults that I termed as global stag-deflation may be the biggest challenge that U.S. and global policy makers may have to face in 2009. It will not be easy to prevent this toxic vicious circle unless the process of recapitalizing financial institutions via temporary partial nationalization of them is accelerated and performed in a consistent and credible way; unless such actions are combined with massive fiscal stimulus to prop up aggregate demand while private demand is in free fall; unless the debt burden of insolvent households is sharply reduced via outright large debt reduction (not cosmetic and ineffective “loan modifications”); and unless even more unorthodox and radical monetary policy actions are undertaken to prevent pervasive deflation from setting in.
Thus, while the Fed may pursue radical, “crazy” and “crazier” monetary policy actions the true policy responses to the risk of deflation may lie elsewhere: when monetary policy is in a liquidity trap a properly-targeted fiscal stimulus is more appropriate and effective; cleaning up the financial system and properly recapitalize it is necessary; and debt deflation and debt overhang problems are more directly and properly resolved through debt restructuring and debt reduction than by trying to reduce the real value of such liabilities via higher inflation.
Post a Comment