Their political clout will rise further when leadership transition takes place this year
By Goh Sui Noi 22 April 2012
After Bo Xilai was sacked as party boss of Chongqing city last month, Beijing sent Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang there to replace him.
At first glance, there is nothing remarkable in this arrangement. Except that Mr Zhang, like Mr Bo, is a princeling.
‘Princeling’ - translated from the Chinese term taizi dang or literally ‘crown prince party’ - is a derogatory term for the offspring of Communist revolutionaries and high-ranking officials because they are largely unpopular with the people for the nepotism and special privileges they enjoy and the political power and wealth they hold.
Some see Mr Bo’s fall - he was also suspended from the Politburo, a top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - as a setback for the princelings.
If so, it is not huge. For his quick replacement by one of their kind shows that the princelings’ political clout is not about to wane. If anything, it is set to grow after the leadership transition later this year.
For come October or November, barring mishaps, the new chief of the CCP will be a princeling - current Vice-President Xi Jinping, 58, son of Mr Xi Zhongxun, a communist revolutionary who went from founding guerilla bases in the 1930s to spearheading China’s economic reforms in Guangdong in the late 1970s.
Princelings have parlayed their privileged upbringing - going to the best schools - and family ties into fast-track careers in politics, business and even the military.
As pointed out by Professor Li Cheng, an expert in Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution, all top leaders with princeling backgrounds benefited from family ties early in their careers.
Many were born in the 1940s and 1950s. The younger ones had their studies interrupted during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.
However, because of their family ties, several returned to college in the early 1970s, including Mr Xi and Mr Li Yuanchao, 62, now head of the powerful Organisation Department of the party and son of a former vice-mayor of Shanghai.
They also often received short-cuts in their career path. For example, Mr Xi and Mr Bo, 62, became party secretary and mayor respectively of Fuzhou and Dalian, cities whose economic planning was under the direct supervision of the State Council, China’s Cabinet. Appointments to top municipal leadership posts such as these often led to additional promotions, Prof Li said in an article.
Interestingly, however, because of resentment and opposition to nepotism, not just in Chinese society, but also among party cadres, princelings can sometimes see their career climb blocked.
At the selection for members to the Central Committee in 1992, for example, Mr Xi, Mr Bo and Mr Chen Yuan, son of revolutionary Chen Yun, were not elected.
Still, princelings have been gaining a higher profile in politics, with several having occupied high positions since the 17th party congress in 2007.
Princelings have also entered business, chiefly as captains of state-owned enterprises. Hints of just how wealthy they have become can be gleaned from information that occasionally slips into public view. In 2010, Chinese learnt through the Internet that former vice-president Zeng Qinghong’s son had bought a harbour-front mansion in Sydney to the tune of US$32.4 million (S$41 million).
In the military, a princeling who is a rising star is senior general Liu Yuan, son of former president Liu Shaoqi, who was heir-apparent to Mao Zedong until he was purged in the late 1960s. He is said to be close to Mr Xi and tipped to be elevated to vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission after the party leadership transition later this year.
However, while princelings have a common political identity and may have known one another from young, they do not necessarily hold the same ideological values. So while some may build alliances with each other to promote their common interests, there are others who stay apart.
For example, Mr Li Yuanchao is closer to the faction led by President Hu Jintao known as the tuanpai as most are alumni of the Chinese Communist Youth League or the Gong Qing Tuan.
Indeed, there appears to be a new group of princelings pushing for reforms outside of the corridors of power. Last year, Mr Hu Deping, son of the late reform-minded party general secretary Hu Yaobang, organised closed-door seminars for intellectuals and other princeling children of reform-minded leaders to build a consensus for reform.
The call for political reform is timely.
The fall of Mr Bo, once seen as a political rising star, and the chaotic aftermath show just how unstable the succession process can be without an institutionalised procedure.
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Princelings still rule despite Bo’s ouster
Their political clout will rise further when leadership transition takes place this year
By Goh Sui Noi
22 April 2012
After Bo Xilai was sacked as party boss of Chongqing city last month, Beijing sent Vice-Premier Zhang Dejiang there to replace him.
At first glance, there is nothing remarkable in this arrangement. Except that Mr Zhang, like Mr Bo, is a princeling.
‘Princeling’ - translated from the Chinese term taizi dang or literally ‘crown prince party’ - is a derogatory term for the offspring of Communist revolutionaries and high-ranking officials because they are largely unpopular with the people for the nepotism and special privileges they enjoy and the political power and wealth they hold.
Some see Mr Bo’s fall - he was also suspended from the Politburo, a top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - as a setback for the princelings.
If so, it is not huge. For his quick replacement by one of their kind shows that the princelings’ political clout is not about to wane. If anything, it is set to grow after the leadership transition later this year.
For come October or November, barring mishaps, the new chief of the CCP will be a princeling - current Vice-President Xi Jinping, 58, son of Mr Xi Zhongxun, a communist revolutionary who went from founding guerilla bases in the 1930s to spearheading China’s economic reforms in Guangdong in the late 1970s.
Princelings have parlayed their privileged upbringing - going to the best schools - and family ties into fast-track careers in politics, business and even the military.
As pointed out by Professor Li Cheng, an expert in Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution, all top leaders with princeling backgrounds benefited from family ties early in their careers.
Many were born in the 1940s and 1950s. The younger ones had their studies interrupted during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution.
However, because of their family ties, several returned to college in the early 1970s, including Mr Xi and Mr Li Yuanchao, 62, now head of the powerful Organisation Department of the party and son of a former vice-mayor of Shanghai.
They also often received short-cuts in their career path. For example, Mr Xi and Mr Bo, 62, became party secretary and mayor respectively of Fuzhou and Dalian, cities whose economic planning was under the direct supervision of the State Council, China’s Cabinet. Appointments to top municipal leadership posts such as these often led to additional promotions, Prof Li said in an article.
Interestingly, however, because of resentment and opposition to nepotism, not just in Chinese society, but also among party cadres, princelings can sometimes see their career climb blocked.
At the selection for members to the Central Committee in 1992, for example, Mr Xi, Mr Bo and Mr Chen Yuan, son of revolutionary Chen Yun, were not elected.
Still, princelings have been gaining a higher profile in politics, with several having occupied high positions since the 17th party congress in 2007.
Princelings have also entered business, chiefly as captains of state-owned enterprises. Hints of just how wealthy they have become can be gleaned from information that occasionally slips into public view. In 2010, Chinese learnt through the Internet that former vice-president Zeng Qinghong’s son had bought a harbour-front mansion in Sydney to the tune of US$32.4 million (S$41 million).
In the military, a princeling who is a rising star is senior general Liu Yuan, son of former president Liu Shaoqi, who was heir-apparent to Mao Zedong until he was purged in the late 1960s. He is said to be close to Mr Xi and tipped to be elevated to vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission after the party leadership transition later this year.
However, while princelings have a common political identity and may have known one another from young, they do not necessarily hold the same ideological values. So while some may build alliances with each other to promote their common interests, there are others who stay apart.
For example, Mr Li Yuanchao is closer to the faction led by President Hu Jintao known as the tuanpai as most are alumni of the Chinese Communist Youth League or the Gong Qing Tuan.
Indeed, there appears to be a new group of princelings pushing for reforms outside of the corridors of power. Last year, Mr Hu Deping, son of the late reform-minded party general secretary Hu Yaobang, organised closed-door seminars for intellectuals and other princeling children of reform-minded leaders to build a consensus for reform.
The call for political reform is timely.
The fall of Mr Bo, once seen as a political rising star, and the chaotic aftermath show just how unstable the succession process can be without an institutionalised procedure.
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