Monday, 24 January 2011
Japan should concede the Diaoyus to China
Tokyo’s recent plan to deploy troops to islands near China raises the prospects of more confrontation with Beijing. But does this move serve Japan’s broader strategic interests? It may be time for Tokyo to think the unthinkable and consider the merits of handing over the Diaoyu Islands, which the Japanese call the Senkakus, to China.
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Japan should concede the Diaoyus to China
Brad Williams
24 January 2011
Tokyo’s recent plan to deploy troops to islands near China raises the prospects of more confrontation with Beijing. But does this move serve Japan’s broader strategic interests? It may be time for Tokyo to think the unthinkable and consider the merits of handing over the Diaoyu Islands, which the Japanese call the Senkakus, to China.
The Japanese government should consider compromising in the territorial dispute because of the shift in power relations between the two countries. China’s rapid economic and military growth has come at a time of unprecedented socio-economic decline in post-war Japan. While China is not without its own problems, Japan has been unable to craft durable solutions for its long-standing woes.
Of course, the power shift alone is not reason enough for territorial concession; Japanese leaders should consider what is taking place in Chinese society.
Though the Communist Party can be credited with putting China on the path to prosperity, its rule rests on shaky foundations. It has had to resort to a potentially unstable mix of development and nationalism to maintain control. Many young Chinese are increasingly being inculcated with staunchly nationalistic views. These firebrands will one day replace the present batch of adroit and pragmatic technocrats, and in doing so could help push Chinese foreign policy in a more assertive direction.
Any Japanese concession over the islands could generate large reservoirs of goodwill among the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, see the territorial dispute in the emotion-charged context of past Japanese aggression.
Moreover, Japan doesn’t really need the islands, to which neither it nor China have unquestionable historical and legal claims. Japanese fishermen might feel aggrieved by the loss but they could still gain access to important fisheries.
For some, ceding control of the islands would increase China’s strategic footprint in the region. However, even without those islands, China already possesses the ability to harass enemy shipping in the East and South China Seas.
Such a grand gesture from Japan would not automatically guarantee smooth relations. The Chinese public would need to be made aware of the Japanese generosity and not be led to think the compromise was inevitable.
Any decision to hand over the islands would be immensely unpopular in Japan. It would most certainly earn the ire of Japanese nationalists who might threaten to sabotage such a move. Any such anger, however, would subside. It is better to aggravate a few thousand Japanese rightists today than continue to create conditions for the rise of potentially millions of anti-Japanese nationalists in China.
A Japanese handover of the disputed islands would encounter obstacles but would probably take the steam out of virulent anti-Japanese sentiments in China and would be a first step in helping both nations move beyond the distrust and acrimony of the past.
Dr Brad Williams is a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Asian and International Studies at City University of Hong Kong
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