Friday, 15 May 2009

Zhao Ziyang alleges Li Peng 1989 scheming


Late leader’s explosive memoirs out

1 comment:

Guanyu said...

Zhao Ziyang alleges Li Peng 1989 scheming

Late leader’s explosive memoirs out

Chow Chung-yan
15 May 2009

A controversial editorial by the Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, that shaped the outcome of the 1989 student democratic movement was prepared by then premier Li Peng without the consent of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.

This is revealed by the late Zhao Ziyang, then party general secretary, in his memoirs, Prisoner of the State, released yesterday.

Two decades after his downfall and four years after his death, the reformist party leader has shattered the official silence cloaking the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown in explosive memoirs he recorded in secret while under house arrest.

According to Zhao, the decision to use the military against peaceful protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square could have been avoided but for the scheming of die-hard conservatives such as Mr. Li, Beijing mayor Chen Xitong and vice- premier Yao Yilin, and Deng’s paranoia about losing power.

The memoirs, based on about 30 hours of tape, were given to three confidants and smuggled out of China, and transcribed and compiled by trusted friends. The book, published in English by US publisher Simon & Schuster, went on sale in Hong Kong yesterday. The Chinese version will be available later this month.

In the book, Zhao says “the scale of the demonstrations, the mess it turned into and why it happened when it did were all the results of the April 26 [People’s Daily] editorial”.

That editorial, in which the peaceful student protests against official corruption that began in April 1989 were labelled “anti-party, anti- socialist turmoil”, stirred the protesters’ emotions and made peaceful solutions increasingly impossible.

Zhao says the editorial was the result of manipulation of information by die-hard conservative leaders such as Mr. Li and Mr. Chen, who played on Deng’s fear of instability and disdain for student movements to their advantage.

“Deng’s discussion with Li Peng and others on April 25 was supposed to be an internal affair. However, Li Peng decided to disseminate the contents of Deng’s remark ... and paraphrased their talk in the editorial that he had the People’s Daily publish on April 26.”

Zhao says Deng and his family were not happy with the way Mr. Li had made Deng’s remark public without his consent. The paramount leader later warned Mr. Li “don’t repeat what you did” and Mr. Li said repeatedly: “I won’t, I won’t.”

But ultimately, it was Deng who should be responsible for what happened, the book says.

“The crux of the issue was Deng Xiaoping himself ... if Deng refused to relax his position, then there was no way for me to change the attitude of the two hardliners, Li Peng and Yao Yilin,” Zhao writes.

“Deng Xiaoping had always tended to prefer tough measures when dealing with student demonstrations because he believed that demonstrations undermine stability.

“Deng had always stood out among the party elders as the one who emphasised the means of dictatorship. He often reminded people about its usefulness. Every time he mentioned stability, he also emphasised dictatorship.”

In the memoirs, Zhao calls for reversing the party’s verdict on June 4 and the need for China to continue its political reform.